Introduction

In 1967, Israel turned an attack by Egypt, Syria,  and Jordan into a crushing defeat that humiliated these countries, and left them seething with resentment and a burning need for revenge. Israel, on the other hand, came out of the conflict feeling nearly invincible, setting the stage for a rematch in 1973 with much more-complex results and long-term consequences. 

Egypt lost possession of the Sinai Peninsula, while Syria lost the strategic Golan Heights. Jordan surrendered the West Bank region and East Jerusalem. In the intervening years following 1967, Egypt and Syria both modernized the armaments, thanks mostly to the aid provided by the Soviet Union, and reformed their militaries. Egypt explored options for recognizing Israel and establishing long-term peace, but mostly its leader, Anwar Sadat, was driven by domestic political pressure to seek revenge. In conjunction with Syria and supported by Morocco, Libya and Iraq, Egypt planned to strike across the Suez Canal and attempt to defeat the inevitable Israeli counterattack with its upgraded air force, now equipped with MiG-21s and huge numbers of SAM missiles.

Israel had been warned that an Arab attack was likely, but a combination of overconfidence and the highest holy days of Yom Kippur meant the country's military was not at maximum alert when Egyptian air attacks began on October 6, 1967, followed by a thrust across the Suez Canal. Nearly simultaneous attacks into the Golan Heights by Syria were so severe and effective that Israel debated arming its nuclear weapons. Not for lack of mistakes, by October 25th, Israel had thwarted both attackers, and their Soviet backer pressed for a cease fire. This halt in place was negotiated, and Israel once again prevailed over its adversaries, though much less-robustly than during the 1967 War.

Osprey Publishing has released Yom Kippur War 1973: Airpower in Israel's Hardest-Fought War by Shlomo Aloni, who has authored dozens of books about the Israel Air Force (IAF).

Contents

The 96-page softcover book in the usual Osprey configuration is divided as follows:

Introduction

Chronology

Attacker's Capabilities

Defender's Capabilities

Campaign Objectives

The Campaign

Analysis and Aftermath

Bibliography and Index

The Review

Aroni is no apologist for the IAF, instead a sharp critic who uncovers the many mistakes made by IAF leadership. Israeli pilots were superbly-trained, and equipped with the finest aircraft then in production, including the F-4 Phantom, A-4 Skyhawk and Mirage III-J. But the IAF tasked its pilots with unrealistic goals (the total destruction of the Egyptian and Syrian air forces), without providing them with the means to accomplish those tasks. This included an insufficient number of bombs for disabling or destroying their adversaries' airfields. After the 1967 War, Egypt especially had learned from its defeat, and hardened its airfields with bomb-proof shelters for aircraft, and introduced Soviet-made SAM-2 surface-to-air missile batteries. The SAMs were mobile, hard to destroy, and effective. The result was an inability to provide a knockout blow to the Egyptian aerial forces as it had promised to Israel's leadership leading up to the conflict.

Additionally, the IAF had so over-performed during the previous war that it was given operational control of the combat airspace. Air control spotters were no longer embedded within IDF ground forces, resulting in little to no Ground Support sorties. Needless to say, IDF commanders were furious at the lack of aerial cover, especially as Egyptian and Syrian ground forces quickly chewed-up Israel's tanks and threatened breakthroughs on both the Sinai and Golan fronts.

It's telling that few to no Arab tanks were destroyed by Israeli air power during the entire war.

Defense Minister Moshe Dayan had to several times re-direct the IAF away from objectives that were not materially important to the conduct of the war, and towards the operational needs of the ground forces upon which Israel's fortunes relied.

Regarding the book itself, Aroni has a deep grasp of the material, but doesn't always convey it to the reader effectively, especially anyone not familiar with the Yom Kippur War. He skips around chronologically through each day of the campaign, sometimes making for difficulty in following his thread. He also prefers to use Hebrew names for the aircraft involved, instead of the American or French names. Fortunately, the IAF only used a handful of jets, but it would have been preferable for a non-Israeli audience to use F-4 Phantom II instead of Kurnass, A-4 Skyhawk instead of Ahit, and Dassault Mirage instead of Nesher.

Still, I can't question the level of his research, and the detailed footnotes that support every assertion. The scholarship doesn't get in the way of what is a good story, either: the IAF was a magnificent fighting service that simply failed during the campaign to realize its pre-war goals or to adapt sufficiently during the conflict to inflict a blow proportionate to the aspirations of its leadership and Israel's overall strategic goals. Given how much of the national defense budget went to the air arm, the results did not live up to pre-war hype.

The book has extensive photographic documentation, though many of the photos are tiny and hard to make out. The illustrations by Danish artist Mads Bangsø add a nice colorful touch to the book. I would have enjoyed a few more of them.

Conclusion

As usual with Osprey Publishing, this book is authoritative and digestible. It's probably a good first-time read for anyone who doesn't know the war, and could be helpful to someone wanting to get into the weeds about each day, the various operations, the tactics used and the results obtained.

Thanks to Osprey Publishing for supplying this review copy. Be sure to mention you saw the book reviewed on Aeroscale when ordering your own copy.